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Abstract
Banks are more liquid, better capitalised, and more profitable in 
oil-dependent countries. However, bank credit to the private sec-
tor is relatively low as a percentage of GDP. The low level has been 
blamed, amongst other reasons, on governments’ reliance on the 
banking sector to finance fiscal deficits. This study examines the 
crowding out effect of government domestic borrowing using a pan-
el data model for 28 oil-dependent countries over the period 1990-
2012. We estimate the model, using both fixed effects and gener-
alised method of moments estimators and find that a one percent 
increase in government borrowing from domestic banks significant-
ly decreases private sector credit by 0.22 percent and has no signif-
icant impact on the lending rate banks charge to the private sec-
tor. This finding suggests that government domestic borrowing has 
resulted in the shrinking of private credit and works through the 
credit channel and not the interest rate channel.
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1 Introduction
Banks intermediate funds from the surplus sector to the deficit 
sector of the economy. Banks are subject to certain regulations by the 
regulatory authorities but they influence the rules in allocating funds 
and thus play a significant role in determining the type of investment 
activities, the level of job creation and the distribution of income (Gross, 
2001). The banking industry in oil-dependent1 countries has changed 
significantly buoyed by the natural resource sector, mergers and acqui-
sitions, the advent of globalization and the emergence of technological 
advances in information and communication technologies. Banks in 
oil-rich countries 2 are more liquid, more profitable, and better capital-
ised (Beck, 2011). However, they disburse less private credit than the 
non-oil countries. For instance, bank private credit from 2000-2011 on 
average in Azerbaijan and Nigeria were 11% and 19% of total GDP, 
respectively (oil-rich countries); whereas bank private credit in Tunisia 
and Bangladesh were 55% and 33% of total GDP, respectively (non-oil 
countries). In oil-rich Democratic Republic of Congo, over the same pe-
riod, bank credit to the private sector accounts for less than 7% of GDP 
(WDI, 2014). This is surprising given the massive amount of excess li-
quidity in the banking sector of oil-rich countries and reflects a weak 
level of financial intermediation.
One of the signs of economic development is the increasing role 
of the private sector. The level of domestic credit measures financial 
1 Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, 
Dem. Rep. Congo, Bolivia, Mexico, Trinidad, Ecuador, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Syria, 
Kuwait, Iran, Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
2 A country is oil-rich if the average share of hydrocarbons in total fiscal revenue and/or 
total export is at least 25 percent. Source:  http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/guide.
htm, p. 2).
129Anyanwu, Gan and Hu / Journal of Economic Research 22 (2017) 127-151
resources provided to the private sector by banks and other financial 
entities. Credit is the oil that greases the private sector; for this reason, 
it is observed closely to assess economic growth. More credit to the pri-
vate sector reflects more opportunity for the private sector to grow and 
develop. The higher this measure, the larger the private sector gets and 
the better is the health and development of the economy. The persistent 
talk in policy circles and the media has increasingly blamed govern-
ment borrowing for the low level of private credit as governments rely 
on the banking sector to finance budget deficits. One of the common 
forms of crowding out happens when a government increases its do-
mestic borrowing and because governments have the ability to borrow 
large amounts of money, doing so can potentially have a substantial im-
pact on the real interest rate. This can suffocate the economy’s lending 
capacity and thus hinder businesses from engaging in capital projects.
The effects of government borrowing can operate through different 
channels, however, many of the concerns have focused on the potential 
interest rate effect. Government borrowing can affect private invest-
ment by crowding out private sector credit directly (real crowding 
out), or indirectly through rising interest rates (financial crowding out), 
though the magnitude of these potential adverse consequences depends 
on the degree to which government borrowing raises interest rates and/
or reduces private credit (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). Nonetheless, 
the occurrence of one channel does not preclude the likelihood of the 
other. The analysis of the effects of government borrowing on private 
investment has been ongoing for more than three decades, empirical 
consensus about the transmission mechanism and magnitude differ 
given economic structure and regulatory constraints. Does govern-
ment borrowing from domestic banks qualitatively drive up interest 
rates, or quantitatively shrink private sector credit? Unfortunately, both 
economic theory and empirical analysis have proved inconclusive. Our 
study is a modest attempt to bridge some of the gaps in the literature 
for the case of oil-dependent economies.
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2  Literature Review
2.1 The interest rate channel
The literature identifies two variants of crowding out: real and fi-
nancial (Blinder and Solow, 1973). The real crowding out occurs when 
the increase in public investment displaces private capital formation, 
which is also called direct crowding out. Direct crowding out refers 
to the substitution relationship between public and private spending 
that occurs not through changes in prices, interest rates, or required 
rate of returns in the public sector, but through the public sector con-
sumption and investment (Buiter 1990, p. 34). On the other hand, the 
phenomenon of partial loss of private capital formation in the economy 
due to increase in the interest rates stemming from the pre-emption of 
financial resources by the government through bond-financing of fiscal 
deficit, is termed financial crowding out, which is also known as indi-
rect crowding out. Indirect crowding out is the consequences of public 
actions that affect private behaviour either by altering the budget con-
straints or by influencing the prices faced by private agents through the 
interest rate:
The standard benchmark for understanding the potential effect of 
changes in government borrowing on interest rates is a model based 
on an aggregate production function for the economy in which gov-
ernment debt crowds out productive physical capital3 . In this simple 
model; interest rate (r) determined by the marginal product of capital 
(MPK), would increase if capital (K) decreased, or was crowded out, by 
government debt (D). The Cobb-Douglas production function is given 
as:
        
 
                                                 � � ���������																															                                               (1) 
                                                            
  
 (1)
Where L denotes labour units, A is the coefficient for multifactor 
productivity, and  is the coefficient on capital in the production func-
3 See Ball and Mankiw (1995), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999)
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tion, then the total return to capital in the economy (MPK*K) as a 
share of output (Y) equals: 
                                 
                                            ߪ = (MPK×K)/Y  
                                          
The interest rate is determined by.
                                             r = MPK = ߪ ൈ ሺY/K) = ߪ × A × (ܮȀܭሻଵିఙ
If government debt completely crowds out capital, so that ∂K/∂D = 
-1, then an exogenous increase in government debt (holding other fac-
tors constant) causes the interest rate to increase: 
 
 
                             ∂r/∂D = (∂r/∂K) (∂K/∂D) =  ߪ × (1- ߪ) × (Y/ܭଶ) > 0 
                                            (Because 0<ߪ <1 and Y, K >0) 
  The level of the interest rate is determined by the level of the capital 
stock and, thus, by the level of government debt. It is the change in the 
interest rate that is affected by the change in government debt. The ag-
gregate effect of government borrowing on interest rate is viewed from 
different perspectives (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1999). First, the Neo-classical 
theory of interest rate argues that financing a budget deficit implies an 
increase in the supply of government bonds at a higher interest rate 
which discourages private investment and results in crowding-out. Sec-
ond, the Keynesian theory asserts that expansionary fiscal policy will 
lead to little or no increase in the interest rate and instead an increase in 
output and income and hence a crowding-in rather than crowding-out 
(Aschauer, 1989). Third, the Ricardian equivalence theorem proposed 
by Barro (1974) advocates neutrality such that increase in the deficit 
financed by fiscal spending will be matched with a future increase in 
taxes leaving interest rates and private investment unchanged. A simi-
lar view is found in the Capital inflow hypothesis which is based on the 
idea that the demand for government debt is infinitely elastic (Dwyer, 
1985). That is, an increase in the deficit will be financed partly or wholly 
not by domestic savings but an inflow of capital from abroad; if this hy-
pothesis holds, interest rates could remain unchanged. 
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2.2 The credit channel
In principle, government borrowing affects private investment 
through the lending rate, however in financially repressed economies4 
particularly in many developing countries, the equilibrium interest 
rate could be somewhat insensitive to market perceptions. Reinhart et 
al. (2011) argue that government debts could have no effect on interest 
rates but have significant effect on private credit due to intervention 
by the government such as administrative controls imposed on interest 
rates, high legal reserve ratio, existence of direct intervention on credit 
allocation, government ownership or control of financial institutions, 
barriers that limit other institutions seeking to enter the market, or by 
moral suasion5. With the existence of these ‘artificial’ constraints, finan-
cial institutions will not take risks because higher interest rates cannot 
be charged which results in many high-yielding projects facing credit 
rationing (Fry 1988, p. 18). Hence, private credit will not be allocated 
according to the expected returns on the projects, but according to the 
quality of collateral, loan size, political pressure, and covert benefits to 
loan officers (King and Levine, 1993). The credit rationing behaviour 
of banks could also be a result of the weakness of the legal institutions 
in enforcing contracts (La Porta et al., 1998). In this case, interest rate 
variability will have no or at best a weak relationship with government 
borrowing. Thus, if the interest rate channel is weak, the quantity chan-
nel will capture the effects of government borrowing. 
Consequently, the degree of quantitative crowding out depends on 
the nature of the endogenous response of the banks to higher gov-
ernment borrowing and how they alter their balance sheets. Banks 
respond to higher government borrowing by adjusting their loan port-
folio optimally given the risk-return characteristics of different assets 
and liabilities (Emran and Farazi, 2009). First, if banks have excess 
liquidity, a higher degree of lending to the government may not result 
in any significant reduction of credit to the private sector. Second, ac-
cess to safe government assets could allow the banks to take more 
4 Financial repressions are measures that governments employ to channel funds to them-
selves, which in a deregulated market would go elsewhere.
5 Moral suasion is an unofficial persuasion tactic used by the government (i.e. the central 
bank) to influence and pressure banks into adhering to preferred policy.
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risk and thus increase their lending to the private sector which is the 
‘safe asset model’ of which without the availability of public debt, bor-
rowers could face higher borrowing costs (Kumhof and Tanner, 2005). 
Such endogenous response by banks could ‘crowd-in’ private credit or 
partially offset the traditional crowding-out effect. The third is the ‘lazy 
bank model’ which posits that a high degree of lending to the govern-
ment may discourage banks from lending to the risky private sector 
and thus stifle their incentives to seek out new profitable investment 
opportunities in the private sector (Hauner, 2009). For instance, Ghana 
has been offering an interest rate of over 15 percent on its Treasury 
Bills in the last five years6. The high single-digit to double-digit re-
turns could encourage banks to invest in government treasury bills as 
opposed to actual intermediation of funds to the private sector.
2.3 Empirical studies
Baldacci and Kumar (2010) examined the impact of public debt 
on interest rates for a panel of 31 advanced and emerging economies 
from 1980 to 2008 with a fixed-effect and system GMM approach and 
conclude that public debt leads to a significant increase in interest 
rates but this is greater in countries with weak initial fiscal conditions, 
weak or inadequate institutions, structural factors such as low domes-
tic savings and limited access to global capital. The study by Aisen and 
Hauner (2013) estimated the impact of budget deficit on interest rate 
with the generalised method of moments (GMM) over a panel of 60 
advanced and emerging economies from 1970-2006. The authors con-
clude that there was a significant positive impact of budget deficits on 
interest rates and only significant when deficits were high, or interact 
with high domestic debt, when financial openness was low, or financial 
depth was low. However, despite the greater attention given to devel-
oped economies, the economies with the highest interest rates and a 
history of fiscal mismanagement are in the developing countries. Akin-
boade (2004) investigates the budget deficit–interest rate relationships 
in South Africa, using the Granger‐causality methods. The author’s 
6 http://www.mofep.gov.gh/financial-news
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results suggest that budget deficits have no effect on interest rates in 
South Africa. Pandit (2005) examined the relationship between long-
term nominal interest rate and budget deficit variables in Nepal for the 
period 1975-2003 and found evidence that there exists a positive but 
insignificant relationship. The author concludes that both the supply of 
and demand for long term government securities are not market based. 
Mukhtar and Zakaria (2008) investigated the relationship between in-
terest rates and government deficits in Pakistan over the period 1960-
2005 and found that government budget deficits did not exert signifi-
cant influence on nominal or real interest rates. Chakraborty (2012) 
examined whether there is any evidence of financial crowding out in 
the recent years of financially deregulated interest rate regime in India. 
The author found no significant relationship between the two. Keli-
kume (2016) applied panel vector autoregression technique (PVAR) in 
18 countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the period 2000-2014 
and concludes that interest rate response to government fiscal deficit is 
insensitive.
Credit markets rarely reach equilibrium through changes in inter-
est rates alone (Temin and Voth, 2005). Thus, changes in the quantity of 
credit will give a better insight of the effect of government borrowing. 
Temin and Voth (2005) argue that examinations of interest rates are 
fundamentally misguided, and that the 18th- and 19th-century private 
loan market balanced through quantity rationing in England. The au-
thors used a vector autoregressive (VAR) approach on lending volume 
at Hoare’s Bank and conclude that there was substantial crowding out, 
that is, a 1% rise in government debt led to a 1% decline in private 
lending. Christensen (2005) regressed private sector lending on domes-
tic debt in 27 sub-Sahara African countries over the period 1980-2000. 
The author’s results shows significant support for the crowding-out hy-
pothesis; an expansion in domestic debt of 1 percent relative to broad 
money causes the ratio of private sector lending to decline by 0.15 per-
cent. Abdel-Kader (2006) conducted a survey of some state owned and 
private banks and 351 firms from various sectors in Egypt. The study 
investigates the extent of credit decline to the private sector in Egypt 
and whether it was due to supply factors (credit crunch), demand fac-
tors (credit slowdown), or other factors (e.g., crowding out). The study 
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found that interest rates were no longer the decisive factor in lending 
decisions. A study by Emran and Farazi (2009) explored the crowding-
out effect using panel data on 60 developing countries from 1975-2006. 
The estimates indicate that a $1.00 more of government borrowing 
reduces private credit by $1.40. De Bonis and Stacchini (2010) investi-
gate the role of total government debt on the size of bank loans to the 
private sector in 20 emerging economies and the result shows that gov-
ernment debt reduces the size of private sector credit and low private 
credit is associated with a large size of government activities. Shetta 
and Kamaly (2014) used a VAR model on quarterly data spanning 1970-
2009 to gauge the crowding out effect of government domestic bor-
rowing on private credit in Egypt. The authors’ estimates indicate that 
$1.00 more of government borrowing reduces private credit by $1.80. 
Ahmed (2016) estimated bank supply side equation in Pakistan using 
3SLS from 1990-2013 and found that government borrowing leads 
to crowding credit away from possible productive use by the private 
sector. Choudhary et al. (2016) analyzed the pressure fiscal expansion 
exerts on the economy via credit markets in Pakistan from 1975-2008. 
The authors conclude that government borrowing leads to crowding 
out of private credit and rise in interest rate spreads.
This research study quantifies the effect of government domestic 
borrowing on lending interest rate and private credit in oil-dependent 
countries. Economies dominated by hydrocarbons possess certain 
characteristics not shared by other economies because their economic 
dynamics are mainly determined by the prices of oil and gas at world 
markets rather than by domestic economic activity, thus the volatility 
and uncertainty of resources revenues pose challenges for the design of 
appropriate policy framework.
3 Data and Model Specification 
This study estimates the link between government borrowing from 
domestic banks and changes in private sector credit and lending rate 
for a panel of 28 oil-dependent countries. The compiled data is from 
the World Development Indicators database and used annual data 
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spanning 1990-20127. The model is based on Emran and Farazi (2009) 
theoretical framework and equation (2) constitutes the specification of 
the empirical dynamic panel data.
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Where   is a scalar such that  < 1;   is an unknown parameter of 
the lagged endogenous variable,  is the unknown parameter vector of 
the K exogenous variables, Xi,t as row vector of explanatory variables 
with the dimension of K = n x 1 with n equals the number of exogenous 
variables, but it is acknowledged that these variables may not be exog-
enous, it has unobservable country-specific, time-invariant effects, ( ) and 
the residuals ( ), such that   =  + . Where the residuals ( ) are 
white-noise such that the  ~ IID (0, ),  ~ IID ( ),  i = 1, 2, 3,…..N is 
an index for individual sample of oil-dependent countries, where N = 
28, t = 1, 2,3,….T is an index for time-variant periods, in this case, years, 
so that T = 6 for four-year average base estimation such as 1990-1993, 
1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005, 2006-2009, 2010-2012 whilst T = 23 
for the estimations involving the study period, 1990-2012. 
This model is based on the assumptions that (i) the error term is or-
thogonal to the exogenous variables so that E (xit ) = 0; (ii) the inde-
pendently and identically distributed error terms are uncorrelated with 
the lagged endogenous variable implying that E (Cit-1 ) = 0; (iii) the 
exogenous variables might be correlated with the individual effect, for 
which reason E (xit vi)  0; (iv) the past value is prone to affect the pres-
ent such that E (Cit Ci,t-1)  0, so there is a need to capture the dynamic 
effects of the dependent variable and, (v) the country-specific effect and 
the disturbance error are independent of each other E (vi ) = 0.
Bank Private Credit and Domestic Lending Rate are the dependent 
variables. Bank credit issued to the private sector, is the credit provided 
by the banking system to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. 
This measure is better than other measures of financial development 
used in the literature because it is more directly linked to investment 
and growth (Calderón and Liu 2003, p. 326; Fitzgerald, 2006). Domes-
7 It takes non-overlapping four-year averages to reduce the potential bias arising from hav-
ing a large number of time observations in dynamic panel estimation. This is only for the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations.
137Anyanwu, Gan and Hu / Journal of Economic Research 22 (2017) 127-151
tic lending rate measures the bank lending rate that usually meets the 
short- and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. Given 
that most interest rates are highly correlated, the commercial banks’ 
lending rate is used as a proxy for the nominal interest rates (e.g. Bhal-
la, 1995).
Domestic Debt is the independent variable of interest which mea-
sures the claims on the central government by the domestic deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions. The sign for this variable 
is expected to be negative because an increase in government borrow-
ing could crowd out private credit as espoused (e.g. Christensen, 2005), 
and it is expected to be positive for lending rate because increased gov-
ernment borrowing could potentially raise lending rate (e.g. Ford and 
Laxton, 1999).
The set of control variables8 embodied in Xi,t are: 
Per Capita GDP is included as an indicator of growth. We control for 
per capita income growth as rapidly growing economies are likely to 
have greater demand for and supply of credit (e.g. Djankov et al., 2007; 
Emran and Farazi, 2009). 
Money Supply measures the sum of currency outside banks, demand 
deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, sav-
ings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the 
central government. We control for this variable because an increase in 
the supply of money might lead to liquidity surges – thus to credit ex-
pansion.
Trade Openness is calculated as the ratio of the country's total trade; 
the sum of exports plus imports, to the country's gross domestic prod-
uct. We control for this variable since a relatively open economy could 
dampen the effect of government borrowing. 
Institutional Quality Index is included because better institutions 
are associated with more transparency and accountability, less corrup-
tion, and better protection of property rights. As a proxy for the quality 
of institutions, we use the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedom. This index aggregates 10 components with equal weight 
namely, trade policy, fiscal burden, government intervention, monetary 
policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance, prop-
8 Trade Openness, Money Supply, Private Credit, and Government Domestic Debt are mea-
sured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. The variables are in logs.
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erty rights, wages and prices, regulation, and black market. The index 
assigns a score (0-100) to each country’s performance and higher scores 
correspond to higher levels of institutional quality. We control for this 
variable because better institutions is an important determinant of pri-
vate credit (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997).
Inflation is included to account for macroeconomic stability. It is the 
growth rate of annual consumer price index (CPI). We control for this 
variable because high inflation distorts the credit allocation process 
and deteriorates credit quality which undermines the supply of loan-
able funds (e.g. Baum et al., 2009).
Price of Crude Oil is calculated using Brent Crude which serves as 
a major benchmark price for purchases of oil worldwide. Introducing 
the oil price index allows us to measure the impact that fluctuations in 
world oil price could have on the supply of loanable funds. We deflate 
this variable by CPI to obtain the real crude oil price. We control for 
this variable because an increase in the price of crude oil will result 
in a windfall and increase the supply of loanable funds. It could also 
dampen the effect of government borrowing on bank credit.
4 Econometric Results
4.1  OLS and Fixed-effect: Government borrowing and private 
sector credit
The basic model9 specifying the private credit from the banking sec-
tor is expressed as follows:
11 
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                             (3)
9 We deviated from the bank specific factors such as overhead cost, competition, interest 
spread etc. These explanatory variables were omitted as we improvise the specification ac-
cording to the purpose of the study which is to assess the role of government borrowing 
from domestic banks on private credit to understand the transmission channel of the crowd-
ing out phenomenon.
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Where C is the log of real private credit as a percentage of GDP, 
G is the log of real government borrowing as a percentage of GDP, 
Y is the real GDP per capita growth rate, F is the log of real level of 
financial debt, I is the inflation rate expressed as a percentage, O is 
the real price of crude oil, Q is the institutional quality, R is the lend-
ing rate expressed as a percentage, and  is the error term that in-
cludes all unobservable influences on private credit. The focus is on 
the parameter  ; crowding out of private credit by government bor-
rowing implies that   < 0, while crowding in of private credit implies 
 > 0. We present the fixed effect model results in Table 1. The regres-
sion results shows that the effect of government borrowing on private 
credit is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. 
Table 1. Determinants of private credit, 1990-2012
Privatecredit Privatecredit Privatecredit Privatecredit Privatecredit Privatecredit Privatecredit
Domes-
ticdebt
-0.372 -0.276 -0.275 -0.190 -0.190 -0.192 -0.204
(10.83)** (15.03)** (14.95)** (10.12)** (10.12)** (9.95)** (9.36)**
Money-
supply
0.653 0.641 0.679 0.666 0.660 0.623
(38.92)** (32.37)** (34.22)** (27.96)** (26.66)** (22.42)**
Oilprice 0.172 0.153 0.147 0.096
(1.18) (1.02) (0.93) (0.45)
InstQ 3.729 3.649 4.374 4.350
(4.10)** (3.99)** (4.23)** (3.42)**
Inflation 0.024 -0.063
(1.19) (1.59)
GDPper-
capita
0.472
(4.52)**
Lendin-
grate
1.630
(2.47)*
_cons 273.197 29.576 26.737 -190.973 -188.429 -224.958 -264.513
(37.11)** (4.01)** (3.44)** (3.79)** (3.73)** (3.97)** (3.64)**
R2 0.17 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80
N 620 620 619 452 452 429 363
The dependent variable is real private credit.
All variables are in log, except oil price, institutional quality, inflation, lending rate and GDP 
per capita growth rate
The model is estimated with fixed-effect estimator with * and ** indicating significant at the 5 
and 1 per cent level.
Source: Author’s estimations
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In other words, when government borrows $1 from domestic banks, it 
crowds out private credit by $0.20. The fixed-effect estimator mitigates 
the omitted variable problems by drawing fixed effects out of the er-
ror term. However, the estimates could be biased due to endogeneity 
arising from simultaneity as private and public credit are mostly deter-
mined by the highest achievable performance of the banks given regu-
latory constraints. Then again, reverse causality might be trivial given 
the dominance of governments in oil-rich economies.
4.2  OLS and Fixed-effect: Government borrowing and lending 
interest rate 
The basic model10 specifying the lending rate to the private sector is 
expressed as follows:
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The focus is on the parameter   ; crowding out by government bor-
rowing in relation to lending rate implies that   > 0,  while crowding 
in implies   < 0. We used the fixed-effect panel regression on pooled 
data11. The estimated coefficients for equation (4) is presented in Table 
2. The regression results shows that the effect of government borrow-
ing on lending interest rate is negative and statistically insignificant. 
The fixed-effect estimator improves the OLS model by mitigating the 
omitted variable problems; however, the estimates could be affected 
by endogeneity resulting from a loop of causality between the lending 
interest rate and government borrowing. Again, this could be negligible 
10 We have not drawn heavily on the determinants of interest rate model such as government 
consumption, private consumption, private savings, etc. This omitted variables are not re-
quired for our analysis as we improvise the specification according to our purpose which is 
to assess the role of government borrowing in the lending rate to understand the transmis-
sion channel of the crowding out effect 
11 The Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the other regressors for the baseline model at the 1-percent level. Thus we use the fixed ef-
fect model.
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given the relatively strong grip of governments on domestic banks in 
the oil-rich economies.
Table 2. Determinants of lending interest rate, 1990-2012
Lendingrate Lendingrate Lendingrate Lendingrate Lendingrate Lendingrate Lendingrate
Domes-
ticdebt
-0.020 -0.035 -0.040 -0.044 -0.045 -0.053 -0.031
(0.75) (1.31) (1.57) (1.32) (1.40) (3.05)** (1.60)
Money-
supply
-0.086 0.029 -0.100 0.021 -0.010 -0.098
(3.64)** (1.02) (3.00)** (0.53) (0.45) (2.82)**
Oilprice -0.160 -0.142 -0.098 -0.104
(6.90)** (4.99)** (6.16)** (6.54)**
InstQ -0.555 -0.459 0.030 -0.033
(3.37)** (2.86)** (0.31) (0.34)
Inflation 0.051 0.051
(30.44)** (30.61)**
GDP-
capita
0.123
(1.43)
Bank-
credit
0.123
(2.84)**
_cons 17.804 21.237 23.421 52.489 48.360 18.753 21.669
(31.05)** (19.29)** (21.24)** (5.71)** (5.40)** (3.50)** (3.98)**
R2 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.76 0.77
N 543 543 542 408 408 386 386
The dependent variable is nominal lending interest rate 
All variables are in log, except oil price, institutional quality, inflation, lending rate and GDP 
per capita growth rate
The model is estimated with fixed-effect estimator with * and ** indicating significant at the 5 
and 1 percent level. 
Source: Author’s estimations
4.3 Dynamic OLS and Endogeneity
We employ dynamic OLS as represented in equation (2) to check 
for endogeneity arising from simultaneity (i.e. by adding the lagged 
dependent variable to see if it acts as a regressor). The result shows (in 
Table 3) the adjusted R2 increases from static to dynamic OLS which 
reflects the presence of reverse causation (Wintoki et al., 2012). If the 
lag terms belong there, then they should be included to avoid bias. The 
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results shows “Private credit L.1” and “Lending rate L.1” are statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level respectively which means past values of 
private credit and lending rate explain significant variations in current 
values and thus confirms dynamic relationships. A dynamic process 
modelled with a static model is invariably misspecified and therefore 
incorrect (Keele and Kelly, 2006). There are numerous ways to address 
endogeneity: (i) the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM); (ii) the Two 
Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression model; and (iii) the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. The first two require valid ex-
ternal instruments which are difficult to obtain (Flannery and Hankins, 
2013; Wintoki et al., 2012). Because of the lack of valid external instru-
ments suitable in a panel setting, the system-GMM estimator approach 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is the most suitable method to 
deal with endogeneity issues that arises from the dynamic nature of the 
model. The s-GMM estimator deals with several problems encountered 
in estimating dynamic panel models, such as endogeneity, measurement 
errors and omitted variable bias.
Table 3. The effect of government domestic debt on private  
credit and lending rate
Static Models Dynamic Models
OLS OLS
Private Credit Lending Rate Private credit Lending Rate
Private credit L.1 0.765*(0.000)
Lending rate L.1 0.628* (0.000)
Domestic debt -0.147*(0.000) 0.028 (0.051) -0.091*(0.000) 0.016 (0.140)
Money supply 0.725*( 0.000) -0.071*(0.004) 0.190*(0.000) 0.053**(0.011)
Price of crude oil 0.109 (0.675) -0.050*(0.001) 0.054 (0.710) 0.030 (0.056)
InstQ 0.183** (0.044) -0.253*(0.000) 0.018 (0.718) -0.101 (0.069)
Inflation -0.074 (0.159) 0.055*(0.000) -0.044 (0.146) 0.029* (0.000)
GDP Per Capita 0.143** (0.032) -0.137*(0.003) 0.090**(0.019) -0.092 (0.104)
Lending rate 0.157 (0.053) -0.096 (0.058)
Private credit 0.062(0.053) 0.0529(0.057)
Constant -137 30 -114 19.9
N 363 386 360 377
R2 0.77 0.68 0.98 0.79
This table presents results of static and dynamic OLS. Asterisk * and ** indicate significance 
at 1% and 5%.
P-values are reported in parenthesis. Source: Author’s estimations.
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4.4 Difference and System Generalised Method of Moments
We apply generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel 
estimator12 and utilize the following model specification:
                                     (5)
In equation (5), we control for endogeneity of the variables using 
internal instruments. The system-GMM estimation approach is to take 
the first differences to remove unobserved time-invariant country-
specific effects, and instrument the right-hand variables in the first dif-
ferenced equations using levels of the lagged two periods or more. The 
s-GMM combines this set of equations with an additional set of equa-
tions in levels with lagged first-differences as instruments. 
Table 4. Base model-system-GMM dynamic panel-two step  
robust estimate
      Private Credit Lending Rate
D-GMM SYS-GMM D-GMM SYS-GMM
Constant -782 -77.39 -8.65 86.69**
(224) (0.563) (-1.99) (0.016)
Private Credit L.1 0.261 0.725**
(0.110) (0.018)
Lending Rate L.1 0.895 0.521**
(1.704) (0.050)
Domestic Debt -0.191** -0.221** -0.051 -0.033
(0.036) (0.031) (0.263) (0.257)
Money Supply 0.534** 0.318** -0.367 -0.125
(0.047) (0.032) (-0.075) (0.109)
Oil Price 0.674 0.236** -0.075 -0.038
(0.811) (0.045) (0.162) (0.642)
Inst. Quality 0.812 0.602** -0.082 -0.148
(3.821) (0.042) (0.111) (0.155)
12 There are 28 countries (N) analysed over a period of 23 years (T) and as a result there 
are more countries (N) than years (T). The dynamic panel model is designed for a situation 
where ‘T’ is smaller than ‘N’ in order to control for dynamic panel bias. However, for long 
panels (i.e. small N and large T), the fixed effect estimator may be a better choice because its 
bias decreases as more periods are added (Nickel, 1981). Based on these reasons we present 
both the fixed-effect and GMM estimation results.
144 Government Domestic Debt, Private Sector Credit, and Crowding Out Effect... 
Inflation -0.017 -0.023 0.049*** 0.043***
(0.094) (0.538) (0.001) (0.000)
Lending Rate -0.801 -0.695
(0.256) (0.627)
Private Credit 0.094 0.157
(0.061) (0.155)
GDP Per Capita 0.063 0.105 0.282 -0.009
(0.070) (0.052) (0.115) (0.913)
Countries 28 28 28 28
Observations 148 148 145 145
No. of instruments 18 26 16 24
Hansen J- test 0.847 0.866 0.506 0.661
Diff. in Hansen 0.265 0.924 0.678 0.999
test
2nd Order 0.703 0.482 0.397 0.359
Correlation
P-values in parenthesis, ***, **, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% level. 
Source: Author’s estimations
The validity of the estimates in s-GMM depends on the statistical di-
agnostics13. The s-GMM allows for heteroscedasticity in the data which 
it can control (Baltagi, 2008). Small sample size causes serious problem 
with s-GMM; the standard errors in the two-step approach are biased 
downwards and needs to be corrected for (Windmeijer, 2005). We apply 
the so-called ‘Windmeijer correction’ which is Stata command ‘small’ to 
obtain robust standard errors for the coefficient estimates.
The results of relevant statistical tests and checks for s-GMM are: 
1) The GMM estimator requires that there is first-order serial cor-
relation AR (1) but no second-order serial correlation AR (2) in the 
residuals (Arellano and Bond, 1991). It means one could reject the null 
hypothesis in the AR (1) test but do not reject in the AR (2) test. Our 
results satisfy this test condition: 0.48 and 0.359 for private credit and 
13 The s-GMM estimates are better than the D-GMM estimates when variables exhibit ran-
dom-walk (Bond 2002; Roodman 2006). Our model specification includes macroeconomic 
variables with random walk, as a result, differencing the variables could remove variables 
that are persistent, such as lending rate. The s-GMM produces more efficient and precise es-
timates than the D-GMM by improving precision and reducing the finite sample bias (Baltagi, 
2008). The D-GMM estimator has the weakness of magnifying gaps with an unbalanced 
panel (Roodman, 2006, p.19). Though our panel is balanced, the s-GMM estimates provides 
better statistical diagnostics than the D-GMM.
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lending rate in the AR (2) test respectively.
2) The Hansen J-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the model 
specification is correct and all over-identifying restrictions are valid i.e. 
validity of instruments (Baum, 2006). The rejection of the null hypoth-
esis means the estimates are unreliable. The Hansen test of over identi-
fying restrictions does not reject the null (p = 0.86; p = 0.66) for private 
credit and lending rate respectively.
3) Roodman (2006) suggests checking for ‘steady-state’ assumption 
to investigate further the validity of instruments. The estimated coef-
ficient on the lagged dependent variable in the model should indicate 
convergence by having a value less than absolute unity (Roodman 2006, 
p. 43) otherwise the s-GMM estimates are invalid. The estimated coeffi-
cients of our lagged dependent variables are 0.72 and 0.52 respectively, 
which means the steady-state assumption holds. 
4) Bond (2002) suggests additional checks on the validity of the esti-
mates by checking if the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable falls in between the values obtained from OLS and FE esti-
mators. The results show: for private credit: OLS = 0.76 > GMM = 0.72 
> FE = 0.51. For lending rate: OLS = 0.62 > GMM = 0.52 > FE = 0.49). 
Hence, our estimates satisfy these conditions.
5) The Difference-in-Hansen test evaluates the validity of subsets of 
instruments (i.e levels, differenced, and the standard IV instruments). 
The null hypothesis of this test is that specified variables are proper in-
struments, i.e. the set of examined instruments is exogenous. We do not 
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the GMM instruments. 
6) Roodman (2007) suggests the number of instruments should not 
exceed the number of observations, which is the case here (26 instru-
ments < 148 observations for interest rate; 24 instruments < 145 ob-
servations for private credit). Furthermore, an estimate with a perfect 
Hansen J-statistic sign (i.e. a p-value equal to 1.00) is questionable; the 
p-value should have a higher value than 0.25 (Roodman 2007, p. 10). 
Our Hansen J-test reports a p-value of 0.86 and 0.66 respectively, which 
satisfy this condition. 
Next, we move to an economic explanation of the results reported 
in Table 4. The first variable of interest (Domestic Debt) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level; there is some crowding 
out effect on private credit by government domestic borrowing of (-0.22) 
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in absolute value which is much smaller than the (-1.4) recorded by 
Emran and Farazi (2009) in a panel of 60 developing countries. It is also 
significantly smaller than the (-1.8) reported for Egypt (Shetta and Ka-
maly, 2014). There could be several reasons for this; one might be due to 
the banking structure in oil-rich countries because banks in resource-
based economies tend to display higher profitability and are more liq-
uid and better capitalized. Then, if banks have excess liquidity, a higher 
lending to the government may not result in any significant reduction 
of credit to the private sector. Second, banks in oil-rich economies dis-
burse a small amount of private credit to the private sector, that is, the 
banks are already ineffective in channelling resources to the private 
sector, thus, increased government borrowing could have a smaller ef-
fect on the already small bank credit. Third, resource firms have bet-
ter access to global financial markets because government ownership 
often play a big role in the resource sector (Wolf, 2009). Therefore, the 
resource sectors’ access to international loan markets might contribute 
to the excess liquidity in the banking sector and thus mitigate govern-
ment borrowing from crowding out banks’ lending to the private sector.
The second variable of interest (Lending Rate) is statistically insig-
nificant; government domestic borrowing does not affect the lending 
rate banks charge to the private sector. The reason for the insensitive 
interest rate in oil-rich countries could be the increasingly competitive 
nature of the domestic financial system, though unlikely given the high 
profitability of the banks. It might also be a result of the integration 
among international financial markets, though disputable since finan-
cial integration is associated with features like a liquid equity market, 
a lower cost of capital, and good credit ratings; a rarity in these coun-
tries. It is very likely the financial markets are underdeveloped and/
or governments exert some control on domestic banks since loans are 
typically not given according to the expected returns on the projects 
but based mostly on non-market considerations. 
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5 Conclusions
This study shows that government domestic borrowing has a sig-
nificant negative effect on private credit but it does not result in an 
increase in the interest rate charged by banks on loans to the private 
sector. These research results are important for understanding the 
mechanism through which government borrowing affects private in-
vestment because private investment depends critically on the avail-
ability of private credit, hence, crowding out of private credit may have 
significantly disadvantageous effects on private investment and conse-
quently on economic growth. These results have some policy implica-
tions. 
The effect of government domestic debt in oil-dependent countries 
is ‘substantial’ though smaller than results recorded in other developing 
countries and thus shows the peculiar nature of oil-dependent econo-
mies. However, substantial and persistent levels of government debt 
can cause downward pressure on domestic loanable funds and hence 
hinder private investment. The importance of developing and maintain-
ing strong institutions to control spending, manage debt and maximize 
domestic revenue collection cannot be overemphasized. There is no 
significant change in lending rates as a result of government domestic 
borrowing, therefore governments in oil-rich countries should not be 
overly concerned about whether domestic borrowing affects lending 
rates, but rather focus on the levels of financial intermediation because 
the quantity of credit seems to change without a concomitant increase 
in the interest rate. 
The oil and gas industry dominates economic activities and seems to 
have better access to finance than the other sectors. So, when govern-
ment borrows from domestic banks, the burden of crowding out falls 
heavily on sectors that struggle to access domestic credit and on bor-
rowers that cannot borrow internationally, usually the non-oil sectors. 
It means the non-oil sector suffers most from the increased government 
borrowing on the already thin loanable funds. That being the case, 
governments need to consider the potential implications of increased 
internal borrowing on the burden of crowding-out the financially con-
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strained sectors.
The key macroeconomic variables in oil-rich economies display a 
high degree of volatility; revenue, debt and spending are highly cor-
related with the global crude oil price. Hence, policymakers are en-
couraged to build up a liquidity fund (i.e. sovereign wealth fund) in 
good times that can be tapped to smooth government spending when 
resource revenues fall short. Without the sovereign wealth fund, or even 
with depleting reserve funds, oil-rich economies will resort to borrow-
ing from domestic banks which will exacerbate the already meagre 
loanable funds available to the private sector.
Our results are interesting: government domestic borrowing has 
resulted in the shrinking of private credit and this works through the 
credit channel and not through the interest rate channel.
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